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# xSTRT and vxSTRT

The problems with existing tokenomics:
• The space is littered with protocols with no substantial performance mining rewards (or anything similar), which fail to get the flywheel going for user uptake. This inevitably leads to the failure of many such protocols for various reasons, including the lack of incentive for users to use such protocols.
• Conversely, the space is littered with protocols that emit performance mining rewards on a substantial scale - but without utility attached to the tokens. Such protocols effectively give smaller and smaller fractions of value until the value approaches zero. A simple staking mechanism merely delays the onset of the problem.
• Stated differently, on such failing protocols, the only purpose of the token is speculation, whether immediate or delayed.

### SolStreet's Tokenomics

• Tokens should incentivise protocol-enhancing behavior, including using the protocol and participating in its governance. Without the locking mechanism, the incentivisation is retrospective alone. Users who commit to locking the tokens illustrate a commitment to being users in the future and, as such, are rewarded prospectively.
• Tokens will have greater value in the hands of holders who are also users, particularly those users who have committed to the protocol into the future.
• On SolStreet, commitment (either through staking or one of the launch mechanisms) is required to access and fully participate in half of the protocol’s tokens. There is no other way to get these tokens. Therefore, the performance mining programme not only incentivises performance but also creates a reason for users to acquire the token itself to participate in the platform.
• By staking and actively participating in governance or providing liquidity in DEXs for other users to acquire tokens to access the protocol (as described herein), users would be incentivised with STRT rewards.
A user’s participation in the governance vote and Staking Pool is determined by the user’s
$STRT$
Power:
$STRT\ Power_i = Unlocked\ xSTRT_i \ +\ locked\ xSTRT_i\ +\ vxSTRT_i$
​A user can stake
$STRT$
into the
$xSTRT$
$xSTRT$
tokens at a ratio of 1:1 between
$STRT$
and
$xSTRT$
(Unlocked
$xSTRT_i$
).
$xSTRT$
is not locked for any period.
In order to gain increased
$STRT$
Power, a user can lock
$xSTRT$
for a maximum of 2 years (Locked
$xSTRT_i$
) in order to receive a maximum of 2x
$vxSTRT$
(
$vxSTRT_i$
):
$vxSTRT_i\ =\ Locked\ xSTRT_i \ *\ \left( \displaystyle{\frac{Chosen\ Lock\ Months_i}{Maximum\ Lock\ Months}}\right) \ *\ 2$
$xSTRT$
will remain locked for the chosen period. A user can re-lock
$xSTRT$
at any time up to a maximum of 2 years. This period is alterable by governance vote.
$vxSTRT$
are points, not tokens. They are accordingly non-transferable. The strength of the user in governance votes and staking pools is:
$\displaystyle{\frac{STRT\ Power_i}{Total\ STRT\ Power}}$